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The Scope of Section 1985 (3) in Light
of Great American Federal Savings
and Loan Association v. Novotny:
Too Little Too Late?
By TAUNYA LOVELL BANKS*

Introduction
After the close of the Civil War and the legal end of slavery, Congress began to redefine the legal status of approximately four million
newly emancipated blacks. At this time, most blacks resided in the
eleven Southern states that comprised the Confederacy. 1 During the
fall and winter of 1865-66, these states enacted so-called "Black Codes"
which placed varying degrees of political, social, and economic restrictions on blacks.2 In response to these codes, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.3
Section 1 of the 1866 Act extended all rights of citizenship to former slaves.4 The Act also provided former slaves alleging discrimina• Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law,
Texas Southern University, Houston, Texas. B.A., 1965, Syracuse University; J.D., 1968,
Howard University. The author wishes to express her appreciation for the research assistance of Gerald Liedtke, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University,
Class of 1982.
1. The confederate states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. D. BELL, RAcE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 3-24 (2d ed. 1980); J.H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER
THE CML WAR passim (1961); Grossman, The Unhappy History o/ Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1324-25 (1951).
2. The Black Codes were designed generally to take the place of the defunct Slave
Codes. The Black Codes differed slightly from the Slave Codes in that under the Black
Codes, blacks were granted some rights: to own property, to make contracts, to sue and be
sued, to legally marry, and to testify in court. Nevertheless, the Black Codes prohibited
blacks from obtaining certain types of employment, possessing firearms, and joining the
militia, and they often subjected blacks to vagrancy laws that were inapplicable to whites. B.
QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 129-30 (1964). See also J. FRANK & R.
MURRO, The Original Understanding o/ Equal Protection o/ the Laws, in ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 67 (1973).
3. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
4. ''That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
[579]
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tion access to federal courts. 5 Congress had based its authority for this
legislation on the Thirteenth Am.endment;6 however, continuing doubts
as to the Act's constitutionality prompted the Joint Committee on Reconstruction to recommend, in its April, 1866 report to Congress, the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment.7
During this period, several counter-Reconstruction organizations
were formed in the South by reactionaries who believed that the Reconstruction efforts threatened the political and social structure of their
states. 8 These organizations opposed equality between blacks and
whites, often punishing "offenders" of either race. The most notorious
group of counter-Reconstructionists was the Ku Klux Klan, which used
a variety of techniques to preserve white supremacy, including threats,
such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." Civil Rights Act
of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
5. "That the district courts of the United States, within their respective districts, shall
have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offenses
committed against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of
the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts of judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any
of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act . . . ." I d. at § 3.
6. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII, § 1. This amendment,
adopted in February 1865 and ratified in December 1865, 13 Stat. 567, 774-75 (1865), simply
extended to the entire country the principle of President Lincoln's proclamation of September 22, 1862. G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 974 (lOth ed. 1980).
7. See opening remarks of Senator Stevens in support of the Fourteenth Amendment,
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). The proposed Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted by Congress in June 1866 and was ratified by the states in 1868. 14 Stat. 358-59
(1866); 15 Stat. 708-11 (1868). The Fifteenth Amendment was adopted in February 1869
and was ratified in 1870 to secure the franchise for blacks and to preserve the rapidly disintegrating Republican Party in the South. 16 Stat. 1131-32 (1870).
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
§1.

8. L. BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER 196-97 (1966); J.H. FRANKLIN, REcoNSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 156-58 (1961); R. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED
STATES 27 (1957).
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destruction of property, and physical violence. By the spring of 1867,
the Klan had highly organized spin-offs in all the Southern states. 9
Congress subsequently enacted a series of laws, commonly referred to
as the Force Acts, which were designed to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The first Force Act, the Civil
Rights Act of 1870, 10 was essentially a re-enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, and was amended a year later by the second Force Act.U
The third Force Act, known as the Ku Klux Act, 12 was directed at secret and conspiratorial terrorist groups like the Klan. 13 Section 1 of
that Act, now codified in part as 42 U.S.C. section 198~, provided civil
remedies for interferences with federal rights ''under color" of law. 14
Section 2, now codified as 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), provided civil
remedies for private conspiracies directed at interferences with federal
rights. 15
Both provisions of the Act lay dormant for almost ninety years, 16
in part because of a series of Supreme Court cases that weakened the
protection provided by these post-Civil War amendments and statutesP The Court restricted the reach of these provisions, not only be9. J.H. FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 156-58.
10. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
11. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433.
12. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
13. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871).
14. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S. C. § 1983
(1976).
15. "[If] two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one
or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). Although the language
of the section has remained the same, it was codified in the 1970 United States Code as
§ 1985(3), in the 1976 United States Code as § 1985(c), and in the 1979 Supplement to the
United States Code as § 1985(3). This article will use the designation § 1985(3).
16. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), was the first United States Supreme
Court decision to interpret § 1985(3). The Court's conclusion that the statute reached only
conspiracies conducted under state law in effect prohibited the use of§ 1985(3) to remedy
private discrimination. This part of the Collins opinion was overruled in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), which held that no state action was necessary to recover under
§ 1985(3).
17. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), held the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply to the wrongful acts of private individuals in the absence of some state sup-
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cause it felt the tremendous pressure exerted by Southern conservatives
on the race question, but also because it was concerned about the extent
to which the federal government should be allowed to regulate areas
that traditionally rested within the states' domain. 18 The Court thus
restricted what it felt to be excessive federal power in an attempt to
balance the powers between the federal and state governments. In the
last two decades, sections 1983 and 1985(3) have been reactivated by
litigants combating racial and other class-based invidious discrimination, 19 who have found that the scope of protection and relief available
under these statutes is often broader than that accorded by modem federal statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 The utility of section 1985(3) was limited, however, by Great American Federal Savings
& Loan Association v. Novotny, 21 in which it was found that the scope
of section 1985(3) is not coextensive with the scope of section 1983.
port. See also Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Louisville, New Orleans and Tex.
Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Except for the Slaughter-House Cases, all these decisions were handed down after the 1877 Hayes/Tilden compromise which signaled the end of
the Reconstruction era. For the effect of the 1877 compromise, see generally THE CML
RIGHTS RECORD: BLACK AMERICA AND THE LAW 1849-1970, at 26 (R. Burdolph ed. 1970).
See also D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 26-28 (2d ed. 1980).
18. J.H. FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 203-07. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 18-19 (1883).
19. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), required that the conspiracy actionable
under§ 1985(3) (I) involve "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based. invidiously discriminatory animus" behind the conspirator's action which is (2) "aim[ed] at a deprivation of the
equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." Id. at 102. Courts have found rights
subject to protection under § 1985(3) to include: the right to vote, Means v. Wilson, 522
F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1973); the right to cast a ballot in a state election, Cameron v. Brock, 473
F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973); the rights to worship and to assemble, Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489
F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) and Action v. Shannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane);
the right to equal pay, Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1978); the right to file
for bankruptcy, McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
bane); the right to be free from state zoning law violations, Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404
(1st Cir. 1971); and the right to be free from state civil rights deprivations, Life Ins. Co. ofN.
Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Note, 77te lf(fects ofthe Thirteenth
Amendment on 42 U.S.C § 1985(c)-Fisher v. Shamburg, 12 ToLEDO L. REv. 959,973-74
(1981).
20. Civil Rights Act of·l964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 {1964), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13 (1972), Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 375 (1972), Pub. L.
No. 93-608, 88 Stat. 1972 (1975), Pub. L. No. 94-273, 90 Stat. 377 (1976) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For example, under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, litigants are not entitled to a jury trial, cannot seek punitive or full
compensatory relief, and are bound by a statute of limitations that is shorter than those
applicable to the older statutes. Great Am. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366, 372-75 (1979).
21. 442 u.s. 366 (1979).
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In that case, respondent John R. Novotny, a loan officer and a
member of the board of directors of Great American Federal Savings
and Loan Association, alleged that the Association intentionally engaged in a course of conduct the effect of which was to deny its women
employees equal employment opportunity. Novotny was fired after he
expressed support for the women employees at a board of directors
meeting. He alleged that his employment was terminated because of
his support for the women employees. Novotny filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII, 22 received a right-to-sue letter,23 and sued the Association and its directors
in district court. He claimed damages under section 1985(3), asserting
that he had been injured as a result of a conspiracy to deprive him of
equal protection and equal privileges and immunities under the laws.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the directors of a single corporation could not engage in a conspiracy, and thus section 1985(3) could not be invoked. 24 On appeal, the
Third Circuit, sitting en bane, unanimously reversed the district court.
The court of appeals ruled, inter alia, that Title VII could be the source
of a right asserted under section 1985(3)25 and that intracorporate conspiracies come within the intent of the section.26
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII cannot be
used as the source of the substantive right asserted in an action under
section 1985(3).27 The Court justified the difference in the scope of sections 1985(3) and 1983 by referring to the difference in statutory language28 and by noting the inherent constitutional limitations on the
authority of Congress to regulate purely private discrimination. 29 The
majority opinion, however, failed to address the broader question:
whether section 1985(3) can be used to remedy a violation of any federal statutory right. In concluding that section 1985(3), like section
22. 42 U.S. C. § 2000e (1976).
23. Id. at § 2000e-5(f)(l).
24. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 227, 230 (W.D. Pa.
1977).
25. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the scope of protection provided by
§ 1985(3), see Judge Adams' opinion, speaking for the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, enbane, Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n ~84 F.2d 1235, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1978),
and authorities cited therein.
26. Id. at 1251-53.
27. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378.
28. "§ 1 of the 1871 Act, the predecessor to § 1983, referred to 'rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States,' whereas § 2, the predecessor
to§ 1985(3), referred to 'equal protection of the laws,' and 'equal privileges and immunities
under the laws.'" I d. at 382 (Stevens, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 383.
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1983, is a remedial, rather than a substantive, statute, 30 the majority
opinion provides little, if any, insight into whether the substantive
rights secured by section 1985(3) are limited to the rights secured by the
Constitution31 or include rights created by statutes. This silence is significant, given the concurring opinions by Justices Powell and Stevens,
which posit that section 1985(3) does not redress any federal statutory
right, 32 and Justice White's dissenting opinion, which argues that section 1985(3) "encompasses all rights guaranteed in federal statutes as
well as those rights guaranteed directly by the Constitution.'m
Section 1985(3), given a broad application, could be used as one of
the few vehicles to combat purely private discrimination and to remedy
the type of private invasions of individual rights complained of in the
Civil Rights Cases. 34 Of course, for such a broad application of section
1985(3) to withstand constitutional attack, the Court would have to define more clearly the "constitutional periphery" 35 of section 1985(3)
and to determine the extent of congressional authority to regulate
purely private discrimination. Thus far the Court has refused to do so.
This article discusses whether section 1985(3) creates a cause of
action for violations of any federal statutory rights. Part I will examine
the legislative history and statutory language of section 1985(3) to determine whether Congress intended section 1985(3) to apply either as a
remedial or as a substantive statute. Part II will explore the extent of
congressional power to regulate private discrimination. The final part
of this article will examine the positions of the present members of the
30. Id. at 372. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text infra.
31. But see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). In that case, respondents alleged
that the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Services violated§ 1983 by depriving them of Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits to which they were entitled
under the Social Security Act. Again focusing on statutory language. the Court concluded
that the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 "means what it says," that the plain language encompassed respondents' claim under the Social Security Act, and that§ 1983's remedy encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. I d. at 4-8.
32. Justice Powell found that the reach of§ 1985(3) is limited to conspiracies to violate
"those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution." Novotn;•, 442 U.S. at 379 (Powell, J ., concurring).
Justice Stevens concluded that section 1985(3) was not "intended to provide a remedy
for the violation of statutory rights-let alone rights created by statutes that had not yet been
enacted [at the time of 1871] . . . ." Id. at 385 (Stevens, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 389 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
34. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
35. This language comes from Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), in which the
Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to legislate against private, racially based conspiracies that interfered with the right to interstate travel, but refused
to determine the "constitutionally permissible periphery" of§ 1985. I d. at 107.
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Court in an attempt to predict how the Court might rule on future section 1985(3) claims that allege deprivation of a federal statutory right.

I.

Section 1985(3): Remedial or Substantive?

The majority in Novotny concluded that 1985(3) is a remedial statute and that an action under it must therefore be based on a conspiracy
to violate some otherwise defined, independent federal substantive
right to equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. The majority opinion fails, however, to cite any
authority in support of this conclusion.36 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens inferred that the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 supports the majority's conclusion. 37 In so doing, he
quoted Senator Edmunds, the Senate manager of the bill,38 as say~g in
the 1871 congressional debates that "[a]ll civil suits, as every lawyer
understands, which this act authorizes, are not based upon it; they are
based upon the right of the citizen. The act only gives a remedy." 39
Justice Stevens' analysis of the legislative history is misleading.
First, this quotation is taken out of context. It was part of Senator Edmunds' remarks about section 6 of the 1871 Act, 40 providing for an
inquiry into the character and conduct of the persons who may be summoned to sit on juries in cases arising under the Act. 41 Furthermore, a
review of Senator Edmunds' full comments on section 6 indicates that
he was not concerned about the scope of the section, which is delineated in section 2, but about a semantic technicality that would bar
36. The Court merely asserted lhat § 1985(3) "creates no rights. It is a purely remedial
statute, providing a civil cause of action when some olherwise defined federal right-to
equal protection oflhe laws or equal privileges and immunities under lhe laws-is breached
by a conspiracy in lhe manner defined by lhe section." 442 U.S. at 376 (emphasis in lhe
original).
37. Justice Stevens first cited Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600
(1979), as holding lhat § 1983 is a remedial statute. He continued by quoting Senator Edmunds' comments as to lhe scope oflhe Act during lhe 1871 debates in such a manner as to
imply lhat lhe authorities cited in Chapman are supportive of lhe majority's holding lhat
§ 1985 is also remedial. 442 U.S. at 382 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. The Sixlh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Browden v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1151-52
(6lh Cir. 1980), refers to Senator Edmunds as lhe floor manager oflhe bill. Senator George
Edmunds, a Republican from Vermont, was one oflhe most outstanding radical New England constitutionalists. His legal ability and integrity were well respected. J. FRANK & R.
MURRO, supra note 2, at 81, 86.
39. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 382 n.l (citing CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871)
(remarks of Sen. Edmunds)).
40. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
41. Id.
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plaintiffs who sued under the Act from challenging the jury.42 Specifically, he was explaining that an amendment to section 6 would enable
the aggrieved party to challenge the jury and thereby insure a "pure
and uncontaminated jury."43
The point at which these statements appear is also significant. Because these statements pertain to section 6 of the Act, they cannot be
indicative of the legislative intent of the scope of section 1985(3); it is
section 2, not section 6, of the 1871 Act that is now codified as section
1985(3). Senator Edmunds separately addressed section 2 during the
1871 debate:
The second section . . . only provides for the punishment of a
conspiracy. It does not provide for the punishment of any act
done in pursuance of the conspiracy, but only a conspiracy to
deprive citizens of the United States, in the various ways named,
of the rights which the Constitution and the laws of the United
States made pursuant to it give to them; that is to say . . . conspiracies to deprive people of the equal protection of the laws,
whatever those laws may be . . . . It punishes the conspiracy
alone, leaving the States, if they see fit, to punish the acts and
crimes which may be committed in pursuance of the
conspiracy.44
These comments indicate that section 1985(3) was designed to create a
separate and independent cause of action that would not preclude existing state remedies, but that would provide a right of action to anyone
who was injured by the conspiracy alone. Furthermore, in response to
Senator Edmunds, Senator Ames contended that the 1871 Act was unnecessary because the states had adequate remedies to address the concerns that gave rise to the 1871 Act. 45 Because the 1871 Act was
42. Id. After the comment quoted by Justice Stevens, Senator Edmunds had added,
"This suit, therefore, in the technical sense, instead of being based upon the statute, as it
would be if it were debt for a penalty, is a suit arising under the statute, and the consequence
would be when you come to get before a judge and undertake to challenge a jury, without
inserting the words 'arising under' the provisions of this act, as well as based upon it, any
private patty would find himself debarred of having this inquiry made for his protection at
all, and it would be only in criminal prosecutions based upon the provisions of the statute
that this challenging of the jurors could occur. We thought it important, therefore, to use
words which would enable a judge in all the cases of civil redress to see that the party
aggrieved should have a pure and uncontaminated jury." I d.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 569-70 (remarks of Sen. Ames). Adelbert Ames, a federal general from
Maine, served briefly as a United State Senator from Mississippi and as Mississippi's provisional governor and military commander. V. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 18651890, at 138-39 (1965). Senator Ames' comments are given some significance when considered in light of Representative Fernando Wood's remarks. New York Representative
Wood, by reading into the record letters from the individual Southern governors, indicated
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enacted despite Senator Ames' contention, his remarks also support the
notion that the 1871 Congress intended to create an independent substantive remedy for injuries not adequately redressed by existing state
law.
In order for the majority's conclusion in Novotny to withstand a
logical analysis, state civil conspiracy actions would have had to exist
as substantive rights prior to the Act. A brief survey of conspiracy laws
in 1871 reveals, however, that an action for civil conspiracy was virtually unknown; formal recognition of such an action by a substantial
number of states did not occur until the early part ofthe twentieth century.46 Thus, conspiracy, as understood by the 1871 legislature, was
criminal, not civil, in nature. Moreover, in 1871, even criminal conspiracy was viewed as a separate, substantive crime that did not merge with
any crime perpetrated by the conspirators.47 Since modem civil conspiracy statutes are an outgrowth of the criminal conspiracy laws, Senator Edmunds' remarks evidence an intent by Congress to create a
separate substantive federal civil conspiracy statute that was designed
to punish, in his words, "a conspiracy to deprive citizens . . . of the
rights which the Constitution and the laws of the United States made
pursuant to it give to them ."48 Senator Edmunds' remarks indicate that
Congress was mindful of the distinction between the conspiracy and
any act done in pursuance thereof, and that state laws only provided
remedies for injuries caused by the latter but not for injuries caused by
the conspiracy itself. Thus, the conclusion in Novotny that section
1985(3) creates only a remedy cannot be supported by legislative history; to the extent that civil conspiracy did not exist in 1871, the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 created a new substantive federal right.
In the seminal case of Gr!!fin v. Breckenridge,49 the Court never
refers to section 1985(3) as a remedial statute-in fact, there is language
in the unanimous opinion indicating the contrary. The Court declared
the states' ability to handle any problems that might arise. He made this argument in an
attempt to convince his fellow representatives that the 1871 Act was not needed. CoNG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Wood).
46. See Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, and as a Tort, 7 CoLUM. L. REv. 229, 232
(1907) (hereinafter cited as Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime]; Burdick, The Tort of Conspiracy, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 117 (1908); Charlesworth, Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in
Tort, 36 L. Q. REV. 38 (1920). Some states had a writ of conspiracy, but it was limited to
providing a statutory remedy for malicious prosecution. Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime,
supra, at 232. See also Mott v. Danforth, 6 Watts 304 (Pa. 1837).
47. Further, once civil conspiracy was recognized as an action, it was assumed to be
substantive in nature. Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, supra note 46, at 229.
48. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds) (emphasis added).
49. 403 u.s. 88 (1971).
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that section 1985(3) is not a general tort conspiracy statute, but rather is
a federal tort law designed to punish conspiracies having some kind of
invidious discriminatory animus.50 The abrupt51 and virtually unsupported contention by the majority in Novotny that section 1985(3) is a
remedial statute cannot be seen as anything other than a blatant attempt by the Burger Court to limit access to the federal courts by restricting the use of the post-Civil War civil.rights statutes.
Perhaps the reasoning behind the Court's insistence on a remedial
interpretation of section 1985(3), despite the questionable support of
the legislative history of the 1871 Act, can be explained by examining
two circuit court opinions interpreting the statute. 52 These lower courts
claim that there is no constitutional basis for Congress' power to enact
section 1985(3) as a substantive statute. 53 Further, they contend that
50. I d. at 101-02. Note also the language Justice Stevens used in his majority opinion in
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979). "Section 1985 of title 42,
United States Code, often referred to as the Ku Klux Act, provides a civil remedy in damages to a person damaged as a result of conspiracies to deprive one of certain civil rights."
Id. at 619 n.37 (citing H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1957)). This revealing
language does not appear either in the Novotny majority opinion or in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion.
51. Until Novotny, the Supreme Court had not considered the scope of§ 1985(3) since
Gr!ffin, eight years earlier.
52. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974): Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Note, The Scope of1985(3) Since Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 239 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Scope of
1985(3)].

53. Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972), involved a § 1985(3) claim
by a criminal attorney that a corporate landlord and its agents conspired arbitrarily and
discriminatorily to deny him rental space because of the nature of his clientele. The Seventh
Circuit, while recognizing that the "breadth of the statute's coverage is yet to be determined," id. at 195, found three categories of rights identified as protected under § 1985(3):
the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from the badges and incidents of slavery, the
federal right to interstate travel, as identified by Gr!ffin, and the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. I d. Because the plaintiff did not claim discrimination based on
the Thirteenth Amendment or the right to travel, the court addressed the effect of§ 1985(3)
on private conspiracies to deprive rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court interpreted § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as not empowering Congress to create
additional substantive rights, thereby rendering§ 1985(3) remedial. The court reasoned that
while § 1985(3) does not have the ''under color of' state law requirement, § 1983 does; that
omission is "directed at the prosecuted conduct of the defendants rather than the nature of
the plaintiffs' rights which are protected by the statute." Id. at 194.
Recognizing that "Gr!ffin did not purport to delineate the scope of the rights secured by
[1985(3)]," id., the court in .Dombrowski found the coverage of§§ 1983 and 1985(3) to be
coextensive. It held that the type of protected interest covered by § 1983, ie ., deprivation of
a right secured by the "Constitution and laws," must also be found in 1985(3) actions. I d. at
194-96.
In Bellamy v. Mason's Stores Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974), the court held that
§ 1985(3) gives no relief to a private employee who was fired as a result of his membership in
the Ku Klux Klan. The court reasoned that because the language of the statute, which
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the basic concept of federalism underlying the Court's reluctance in
Gr!lfin to make section 1985(3) a general tort law justifies treating the
statute as a remedial right. Since state civil conspiracy statutes are now
common, 54 applying 1985(3) as a substantive right could pose federalism problems that were nonexistent at the time the 1871 Act was
passed, namely, by creating federal tort actions that mirror state tort
actions and thereby interfering with an area traditionally left to state
jurisdiction.55 Given the current Court's deferential attitude regarding
federal intervention,56 it is highly unlikely that a majority would be
amenable to arguments contending that section 1985(3) is a substantive
rather than a remedial right. The following section of this article will
therefore examine the implications of section 1985(3) as a remedial
statute.

II. The Constitutional Periphery of Section 1985(3): The
Extent to Which Congress Can Regulate Purely
Private Discrimination
In determining the type of interests that section 1985(3) may protect, it is significant that a year after Novotny was decided, the Court in
Maine v. Thiboutot 57 held that section 1983 provides a remedy for all
deprivations under color of state law of rights secured not only by the
Constitution but also by federal statutes. 58 This interpretation of section 1983 is supported by the plain language of the section, which is
directed at state action resulting in "deprivation of any rights, priviprotects against conspiracies to deny "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges
and immunities under the laws," tracks the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
statute requires state action-it does not create its own cause of action that can circumvent
the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also refused to apply
the First Amendment without this state action requirement. It reasoned that "the right of
association derives from the first amendment-itself framed as a protection against the federal government and not against private persons . . . the incorporation doctrine has never
been extended by the Supreme Court to extend to private persons." Id. at 506-07.
54. A review of state laws indicates that civil conspiracy is recognized in most states
either by statute or by common law as either a separate substantive tort or as a tort that
merges with the tort that is the object of the conspiracy.
55. See also Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 659 (1951), in which the Court feared
that a broad interpretation of§ 1985(3) would raise grave constitutional questions concerning the dilution of powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
56. A recent example of this attitude, in the context of Civil Rights litigation, is the
Court's decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), in which the Court found that the
negligent loss of inmate property by prison officials was not cognizable under § 1983 if the
state had an adequate judicial or administrative remedy to cover the loss.
57. 448 U.S. I (1980).
58. Id. at 4-8.

HeinOnline -- 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 589 1981-1982

590

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:579

leges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ."59 TlJ.e
"under color of law" language of section 1983 has been construed to
require some state action. Section 1985(3), on the other hand, contains
no similar language. It is directed at private conspiracies to deprive
individuals of "equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws." 60
The question arises whether or not the statutory language in section 1985(3) provides for the same broad remedial powers as does section 1983. To determine the extent to which section 1985(3) can be
used to remedy injuries from violations of federal statutory rights, the
source of the congressional power to regulate purely private discrimination must first be examined.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment as the Source for Congressional
Regulation of Private Discrimination

The legislative history of the 1871 Act cites the Fourteenth
Amendment as the basis for congressional authority to regulate private
discrimination.61 Supreme Court decisions immediately following the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, substantially emasculated the scope of the Amendment by interpreting it to authorize
only congressional legislation addressing state action and, consequently, left the modem Court with a questionable constitutional basis
for section 1985(3).62
The Court in the Civil Rights Cases 63 suggested that there might be
some constitutional basis for congressional regulation of purely private
discrimination. 64 Nevertheless, it found that the Fourteenth Amend59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979).
61. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871).
62. See note 17 supra. See also F. BIDDLE, Civil Rights and the Federal Law, in SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY TODAY 109, 116 (1945); C. MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF
THE NEGRO 26-27 (1940); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 163 (1951); H.D. Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L B. J. 26, 61-62 (1951).
63. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
64. The Court queried, "Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn, the
public conveyance, or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded
as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only as inflicting an
ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to
redress by those laws until the contrary appears?" Id. at 24. It further stated, "[W]e are
forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought
under the laws of the State; or if those laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him,
his remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has adopted, or may
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ment did not provide such a basis, because section 5 of the Amendment
limited congressional lawmaking powers to legislation designed solely
to remedy state discriminatory action. 65 Eighty-three years later, in
United States v. Guest, 66 the Court said that in order to create rights
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state
involvement need not be direct. 67 Six justices in Guest believed in varying degrees that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could be the
basis for legislation regulating private discrimination. 68
Thus, in Collins v. Hardyman, 69 the Court, relying on the reasoning of the Civil Rights Cases 10 that a private person cannot deprive another of "equal protection of the laws,'m required some state action
before a section 1985(3) suit could be maintain~d. 72 Consequently, in
Gr!ffin v. Breckenridge,13 which overruled the requirement of Hardyadopt, for counteracting the effect of State laws, or State action prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
·
65. "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. . . . It nullifies and makes
void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . [T]he last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To
enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such
prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and
innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it.
It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State
action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation
of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive
of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment." I d. at 11.
66. 383 u.s. 745 (1966).
67. Id. at 755-56. See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 795-96 (1966); United
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
68. "[T]here now can be no doubt that the specific language of§ 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere
with Fourteenth Amendment rights." 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). "I can find no
principle of federalism nor word of the Constitution that denies Congress power to determine that in order adequately to protect the right to equal utilization of state facilities, it is
also appropriate to punish other individuals-not state officers themselves and not acting in
concert with state officers-who engage in the same brutal conduct for the same misguided
purpose." Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. 341 u.s. 651 (1951).
"70. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
71. Id. at 17.
72. 341 U.S. at 661.
73. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Gr!f!in, black citizens of Mississippi filed a damages action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), charging that respondents, white citizens of Mississippi, had conspired to assault petitioners and to prevent them, through force, violence, and intimidation,
from freely traveling upon federal, state, and local highways. The Court held that§ 1985(3)
does not require state action but reaches private conspiracies that are aimed at invidiously
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man that a section 1985(3) suit requires state action, the Court was
forced to find other constitutional sources-the Thirteenth Amendment
and the right to travel-to justify congressional regulation of private
discrimination.
The Court in Gr!ffin did not consider the scope of congressional
power under section 5 when it discussed the constitutional basis of section 1985(3), and the Fourteenth Amendment has not been ruled out as
a constitutional basis for a section 1985(3) claim. To require state action under section 1985(3), however, would merely duplicate the protections already available under section 1983. Nonetheless, there is
some lower court authority and language in Novotn.y 74 and in lower
court decisions75 to support the notion that some state connection must
be shown before section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can be used
successfully as a constitutional basis for attacking private
discrimination.
A resolution of the state action requirement is necessary in order
to determine the type of federal statute section 1985(3) may remedy
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens,
in his concurring opinion in Novotny, suggested that the degree of state
involvement is something less than traditional state action and does not
have to be part of the conspiracy itself.76 Circuit court decisions are
discriminatory deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured to all by law. 403 U.S.
at 95-103.
74. 442 U.S. at 384 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). The majority opinion did not have
to reach the issue of state action because it found that the completeness of the Title VII
statutory scheme precluded § 1985(3) from providing a remedy. Justice Stevens argued,
however, that the section does not provide a remedy for any federal statutory right. He used
the state action requirement to bolster his argument: "[R]equirement of state action, in this
context, is more than a requirement that there be a constitutional violation." Id. at 385
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens cited Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th
Cir. 1972), and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), to support his position that litigants
under 1985(3) must show some state connection before recovering for a private violation of
the right to equal protection. For a full discussion of this question, see Note, The Scope of
1985(3), supra note 52. See also Cohen v. Illinois lnst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 829-30
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School 543
F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976).
75. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1333 (4th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. Illinois
Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 943 (1976);
Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 927 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975); Bellamy v. Mason's
Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 1974); Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th
Cir. 1974); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972).
76. 442 U.S. at 384-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). Note also that Justice Stevens conceded that no state involvement is required for private conspiracies to deprive individuals of
either their right to travel or their right to be free of badges and incidents of slavery, but
argued that recovery for equal protection violations occurs only when state action is present.
Id. at 383-85.
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split on both the degree and the nature of state action required. The
Seventh Circuit, for instance, takes Justice Stevens' position. In Dombrowski v. Dowling,17 that court agreed that some state action is required before a section 1985(3) claim of deprivation of a right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment may be brought. The degree of state
involvement that court thought necessary before an action under section 1985(3) based on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could be
maintained stopped short of state action and seemed to go to the nature
of the right asserted. 78
Two other views have been expressed by the federal courts. The
Fourth Circuit requires traditional state action/9 but the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits do not. Instead, these latter two courts read Griffin as
construing section 1985(3) to reach both public and private deprivations of constitutional rights. The Fifth Circuit finds that a deprivation
of equal protection by private persons occurs not as a result of state
action, but where there has been a conspiracy to "deprive another of
the enjoyment of legal rights by independently unlawful conduct." 80
The Eighth Circuit holds that the Fourteenth Amendment protects certaip rights from both state and private infringement. 81 The Eighth Cir77. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
78. For example, Justice Stevens (then a member of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) in two separate opinions wrote of the type of state involvement required under
1985(3): "For there is no statutory requirement for state participation or support for the
conduct of the individual conspirators proscribed by 1985(3). There is, however, a requirement that the conspiracy deprive the plaintiff of a federally protected right." Cohen v. lllinois lnst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 828 (1975). "It is clear that a private conspiracy to
cause the plaintiff to receive unequal treatment from the state, or a state agency, would ·
violate 1985(3)." Id. at 828 n.27 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)). Three
years earlier, in Dombrowski, Justice Stevens wrote that the state involvement required
under 1985(3) goes to the "nature of the plaintifi's rights" being asserted since only some
rights are protected from state infringement. 459 F.2d 190, 194 (1972).
79. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); Bellamy v. Mason's
Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
80. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1981). See also McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane). In McLellan, the court
considered whether or not § 1985(3) could provide relief for the plaintiff's claim that he was
discharged from his job because he sought voluntary bankruptcy. The court, in construing
the "equal protection of the laws" language in the section, found that a private person could
deprive another of"equal protection of the laws" only when the defendant acted in violation
of a state or federal provision. I d. at 927. Finding that it was not unlawful to terminate
employment of an employee on the ground that he ffied for bankruptcy, the court denied
relief under§ 1985(3). I d. at 933. See also Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 1001-02 (E.D.
Tex. 1978), in which the plaintiffs claimed that their employer and others oonspired to prevent them from pursuing legal action to vindicate their rights, and the court found the action
cognizable under § 1985(3).
81. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971). Action involved a suit by church
members to enjoin picketing and other protest actions by members of the Black Liberation
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cuit cases, however, are limited to instances in which the substantive
right asserted is a fundamental constitutional right.
Adoption of the Fifth Circuit's view would allow the broadest application of section 1985(3) as a remedial provision because the requirement of state involvement would be satisfied by showing that the
object of the conspiracy was the deprivation of some federal or state
law. Thus, if the intent of the conspiracy· was to deny the litigant some
legal right provided by federal or state law due to some invidious classbased animus, 82 it would be a denial of equal protection of the laws as
required by section 1985(3). This view would be consistent with the
legislative background of the Ku Klux Act, because at the time section
1985(3) was enacted, Congress felt that the Southern states' governments were either unwilling or unable to protect the rights of black
citizens adequately. 83 If a state fails to provide the litigant or his class
with rights and remedies available to other citizens and if the alleged
discriminatory action violates a federal statutory right, then, using the
Fifth Circuit's rationale, section 1985(3) could be used successfully to
challenge such action. Although this interpretation would place a
heavy burden of proof on the litigant, it conceivably would allow the
litigant to use ·a federal statute as the substantive basis of a section
1985(3) action, provided that the litigant could show that the federal
statute was designed to protect rights that Congress felt states either
could not or would not adequately protect. As the language in Novotny
and Thiboutot suggests, however, only federal statutes that do not have
Front because the protest activities interfered with church services. Relying on the Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutional basis for vindicating the deprivation of church members' First Amendment rights by a private conspiracy, the court found that § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress "to enforce rights guaranteed by the Amendment against private conspiracies." Id. at 1235. The court also found that its notion of the
scope of§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966), in that it does not necessarily require state action. See note 68 supra. The
court also found its notion consistent with the Supreme Court's "expansion of the concept of
state action." 450 F.2d at 1236 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 229 (1969), and
United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968)). Four years later, in Means v. Wilson, 522
F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit added the right to vote in tribal elections to those
types of interferences by private individuals that constitute a denial of equal privileges and
immunities under § 1985(3). Means involved a candidate for tribal council president who
alleged that certain election irregularities deprived the plaintiff and others of their right to a
fundamentally fair election. The Eighth Circuit cited a Sixth Circuit case, Cameron v.
Brock, 473 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1973), as holding that § 1985(3) protected the right to vote
against private conspiracies.
82. It is clear from the cases that § 1985(3) requires the litigant to show some classbased invidiously discriminatory motive for the conspiracy. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 370-78 (1979), and cases cited therein.
83. See notes 1-15 and accompanying text supra.
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their own separate enforcement provisions can be used as the substantive basis of an action brought under the remedial statutes of the 1871
Act. 84 Therefore, even if one successfully argued that section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutional basis for section
1985(3), the litigant still faces two major hurdles: showing &orne state
involvement, however defined, and finding a substantive federal statute
without a built-in remedial scheme. 85
B. The Thirteenth Amendment as a Constitutional Basis

Given the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Thirteenth Amendment would, at first blush, seem to permit a
broader application of section 1985(3); however, relying on the Thirteenth Amendment as a constitutional source will limit the type of discrimination to that which is racially motivated. Since the Thirteenth
Amendment itself makes slavery illegal, any statute prohibiting some
activity as a badge or incident of slavery can be remedied under section
1985(3). The inquiry under the Thirteenth Amendment, therefore, is
what acts constitute badges and incidents of slavery.
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court conceded that Congress might
have the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate private
acts if those acts in some way constituted badges or incidents of slavery.86 The Court, however, failed to define what these acts were, indicating only that mere discrimination on the basis of race or color was
not considered a badge of slavery. 87 Eighty-five years later, in determining whether or not Congress had the power under section 198288 to
prohibit all racial discrimination, public and private, in the sale or
rental of property, the Court held that Congress has the power to determine what constitutes badges or incidents of slavery and to pass any
laws necessary to eliminate those badges or incidents. 89
84. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 2-8 (1980); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 370-78 (1979).
85. The class protected under the Fourteenth Amendment would include all persons
discriminated against in such a way as to deprive them of equal protection.
86. 109 U.S. at 20.
87. Id. at 25.
88. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
89. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Justices Harlan and White both
dissented, claiming that the history of the Thirteenth Amendment does not clearly indicate
that Congress has the power to reach purely private discrimination. Id. at 473. See also
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits private,
commercially operated nonsectarian schools from denying admission to blacks); Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (white person expelled from a nonstock corpo-
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Although the Court in Gr!f!in found that the Thirteenth Amendment provides one constitutional basis for a section 1985(3) action,90
reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment places limitations both on the
persons to whom section 1985(3) relief would be available and on the
nature of rights that could be remedied under section 1985(3). The
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment has never been squarely addressed
by the Court, but that Amendment clearly does not protect all individuals against all forms of discrimination,91 and a~ost certainly not the
gender-based discrimination at issue in Novotny. In addition, the federal statutory right to be remedied would have to be one that Congress
had determined was necessary to eliminate badges or incidents of
slavery. 92
This determination may be limited by First Amendment privacy
and right to association concerns. For example, in Runyon v. McCrary ,93 the Court held that racially discriminatory admissions policies
of private, commercially operated nonsectarian schools violate section
1981,94 which prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of private contracts. In ruling that the application of section 1981
does not abridge the parents' constitutional rights of free association
ration community recreational association because he assigned his membership share to a
black allowed to sue under § 1982).
90. 403 U.S. at 105.
91. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). But see McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies to white
victims of discrimination in private employment. I d. at 295-96. The Court noted, "[T]he
congressional design to protect individuals of all races is further emphasized by re-enactment of the 1866 Act as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, following ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 289 n.l9.
92. This limitation on the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment could be avoided if the
Court decided that the self-executing nature of§ 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment is capable
of providing a remedy in the absence of congressional legislation defining involuntary servitude. Arguably, the self-executing force of§ 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment is as extensive
as the power of Congress under § 2 to enforce the Amendment by appropriate legislation.
Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Reviral of the Enforcement
Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 14 CoLUM. L. REv. 449, 499 (1974). In the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court acknowledged the self-executing force of the Amendment,
declaring the Amendment's prohibitions "undoubtedly self-executing." 109 U.S. at 20.
Even assuming this to be the case, the Court has invoked its power under § 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment in only a limited number of instances, specifically those cases involving
involuntary slavery. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911). Furthermore, the Court has expressed its hesitancy to declare new laws pursuant to
§ I of the Thirteenth Amendment as it ''would grant it a lawmaking power far beyond the
imagination of the Amendment's authors." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,227 (1971).
The Court has preferred to leave the task of defining the badges and incidents of slavery to
Congress.
·
93. 427 u.s. 160 (1976).
94. See note 89 supra.
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and privacy, the Court noted that no governmental intrusion into the
privacy of the home or "similarly intimate setting" was involved, because the private schools appealed to a public constituency. 95 This
holding implies that, absent a finding of some public character to the
alleged private discriminatory act, Thirteenth Amendment considerations must give way to competing constitutional considerations. 96
Dicta in several cases indicate that there is a constitutional right to
discriminate when competing rights are involved.97 When discriminatory acts occur in purely private settings, the Court must determine
whether or not a governmental interest is sufficiently compelling to
override the right to discriminate. 98 It is doubtful that the Court will
find a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to override the
right of the individual to discriminate in such purely private settings as
the home. The difficulty in distinguishing between purely private acts
and acts characterized as private but with a public character perhaps
explains the Court's reluctance to determine the constitutional periphery of section 1985(3).99 Nevertheless, it does not appear that First
Amendment privacy and right to association concerns will be major
obstacles to section 1985(3) actions relying on the Thirteenth Amendment. Most right to privacy decisions have involved extremely per95. 427 U.S. at 170 n.IO, 178.
96. Id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring), 189 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,463,469-70 (1973), the Court indicated that,
in some circumstances, private racial discrimination might be characterized as an exercise of
freedom of association and therefore be protected by the First Amendment. See also Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298-301 (1966);
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964). For a general discussion of the right of association as a constitutional right to discrimination, see Note, supra note 92, at 520-24; Note,
Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to .Discriminate Versus Freedom From .Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1455-64 (1975).
98. This balancing-of-interests formula is reminiscent of the compelling state interest
test in equal protection cases, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969),
and probably involves similar problems in application. For a criticism of the compelling
state interest test in equal protection cases, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search o/ Evolving
.Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972).
99. See text accompanying note 95 supra. This reluctance also extends to Fourteenth
. Amendment cases. The Burger Court continues to cite the Civil Rights Cases for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment's self-executing impact extends only to state action
and consequently does not reach private discrimination, even though notions of what constitutes state action have expanded considerably since 1883. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 229 (1969); United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968). Nevertheless, the
Court has yet to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment mandates social, as opposed to political, equality between racial minorities and the majority race. It is doubtful that the Court
ever will, because of the difficulties inherent in any attempt by government at prosecuting
social morality.
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sonal invasions of the body, 100 marital relations, 101 or solitude of the
home, 102 and it is doubtful that these types of privacy allegations could
be successfully used to challenge invidiously discriminatory private
conspiracies. Further, although the Court in Runyon suggested that
any associational rights protected by the First Amendment are
designed to promote "the advancement of beliefs and ideas," it recognized that invidiously discriminatory private practices are not afforded
"affirmative constitutional protections. And even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment . . . ." 103
A litigant relying upon the Thirteenth Amendment as the constitutional basis of a section 1985(3) action therefore must plead and prove
that the alleged discrimination was not purely private and that it violated a statute which Congress enacted to eliminate badges or incidents
of slavery. The language of the Thiboutot and Novotny opinions suggests, however, that even if such a statute were found, an action under
section 1985(3) would still be foreclosed if the statute had its own enforcement provisions. 104 Finding a substantive federal statute that was
intended to eliminate badges or incidents of slavery and is without its
own enforcement provisions may be an impossible task.
C. Other Sources: The Rights and Privileges of National Citizenship

The Court in Gr!lftn also referred to the constitutionally protected
right of interstate travel as one of the "rights and privileges ofNational
citizenship" that is "assertable against private as well as governmental
interference. . . . That right, like other rights of National citizenship,
is within the power of Congress to protect by appropriate legislation."105 Despite these promising statements, the Court has been reluctant to define, with any degree of clarity, what rights are included
under national citizenship and whether or not any or all of such rights
are protected from interferences both by government and by private
individuals. 106 Arguably, congressional power to protect these rights of
national citizenship includes the authority to determine what these
100. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut; 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102. See, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
103. 427 U.S. at 175-76 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 354 U.S. 449,460
(1958)).
104. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
105. 403 U.S. at 105-06.
106. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Note that reliance on this constitutional provision would preclude aliens from suing under § 1985(3). In the past, aliens have
used other Reconstruction era civil rights statutes to protect their rights. See Fiallo v. Bell,
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rights are. If Congress has this authority, then it creates another right
or privilege of national citizenship whenever it enacts legislation
designed to provide statutory rights for citizens. Thus, the interference
with these statutory rights by private individuals would be actionable
under section 1985(3), provided that the litigant can show some invidiously discriminatory class-based animus. It is doubtful, however, that
the Court would be receptive to this argument, since it would greatly
broaden the scope of section 1985(3). 107 The recent trend in federal
courts has been to restrict the scope of section 1983; 108 it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will interpret the scope of section 1985(3)
in a manner inconsistent with this trend.

lll. The Future of Section 1985(3): Positions of the Present
Members of the Court
It appears that the development of section 1985(3) will be circum-

scribed by the development of section 1983. First, sections 1983 and
1985(3) are both modem-day codifications of the 1871 Civil Rights Act
and thus have common historical ties. Second, the Court's perceived
problems caused by an expansive interpretation of the scope of section
1983 will surely influence it in developing the scope of section
1985(3). 109 A study of the Burger Court's treatment of section 1983
actions is thus critical in predicting future section 1985(3) decisions. By
examining the opinions in two section 1983 cases, Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization 110 and Maine v. Thiboutot, 111 as well as
the opinions in Novotny, it is possible to predict what the positions of
the present Supreme Court justices will be if directly confronted with
determining the constitutional periphery of section 1985(3).
430 U.S. 787 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
u.s. 67 (1976).
107. Similarly, Justice White's suggestion in his dissenting opinion in Novotny that the
commerce clause provides a constitutional basis for a § 1985(3) action to remedy invidiously
discriminatory conspiracies to deny Title VII rights, 442 U.S. at 396 n.20, will probably not
be embraced by the Court because it would provide an expansive use of§ 1985(3). Use of
the commerce clause would give broader application to§ 1985(3) than either the Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendments because it would not require state action and it would apply to
discriniination based on something other than race. Finally, use of the commerce clause as a
basis for a§ 1985(3) action would be inconsistent with the 1871 Congress' understanding of
that clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-58 (1964).
108. For a discussion of the Court's dissatisfaction with § 1983 actions, see generally
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980).
109. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 382-83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. 441 u.s. 600 (1979).
Ill. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, the Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. subsections 1343(3) and
(4) 112 does not encompass a claim that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the federal Social Security Act. Chapman involved two cases challenging the actions of state officials and
regulations that allegedly violated provisions of the Social Security Act.
The petitioner in one action brought suit in federal district court under
section 1983, c1airning that New Jersey officials, by denying her emergency assistance funds because she was not "in a state of homelessness"
as required by the relevant New Jersey regulations, 113 had deprived her
of a right to such assistance "necessary to avoid destitution" within the
meaning of section 406(c)(l) of the federal Social Security Act. 114 In
the other action, respondents, recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) who shared living quarters with a nondependent relative, brought a class action in federal district court,
claiming that Texas regulations requiring that AFDC benefits be reduced to recipients with such living arrangements violated section
402(a)(7) of the Social Security Act 115 and the federal regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto. 116
Although the Court in Chapman avoided a specific pronouncement on the extent to which section 1983 covers violations of federal
statutes, the four separate opinions in the case provide some clues. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority but joined only by Justice Blackmun, took the most restrictive view of the scope of section 1983. He
argued that section 1983 was intended to apply only to those federal
statutes designed to enforce Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 117
Further, he contended that it is preferable to limit section 1983 to the
federal statutes that are designed to insure equal rights and that are
comparable in nature to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. He concluded
that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
112. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person ... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) to recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)(4) (1976).
113. N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:82-5.12 (1969) (current version at N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:825.10 (1977)).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1976).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976).
116. 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(C), 233.90(a) (1974).
117. 441 U.S. at 615-18.
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claim. 118
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, wrote a concurring opinion. After an exhaustive review of the
legislative history of section 1983, including the work of the commissioners who drafted the revised statute of 1874, Justice Powell basically
agreed with Justice Stevens' view that section 1983 is limited to remedying violations of federal statutes designed to provide for equal
rights.U 9 Justice White, in his concurring opinion, argued that section
1983 applies to all rights secured by federal statutes, "unless there is
clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions arc
exclusive or that for various other reasons a§ 1983 action is inconsistent with congressional intention." 120
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed
with Justice White regarding the scope of section 1983, but he dissented
from the majority's holding on federal jurisdiction, contending that
federal courts have jurisdiction under section 1343(3) to hear any claim
cognizable under section 1983. 121 Justice Stewart also argued that section 1983 actions are barred where the federal statute challenged has its
own enforcement process; 122 however, Justices Brennan and Marshall
did not join this part of his opinion.
In light of Chapman, it is not surprising that Justices White, Stewart, Marshall, and Brennan formed part of the majority in Maine v.
Thibouto/. 123 Thiboutot held that section 1983 did provide a remedy
for all state deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and federal statutes. 124 It also held that an attorney's fees provision is applicable in statutory section 1983 actions 125 and is part of the section 1983
remedy, whether the action is brought in federal or in stat~ court. 126
Interestingly, Justices Stevens and Blackmun also voted with the majority. Of course, since Thiboutot originated in the state courts, the federal jurisdiction question raised in Chapman was not present. 127
Further, the state trial court had allowed the action and had ruled
against the state. 128 Thus, Thiboutot presented no real federalism issue.
118. Id.
Id. at 627-40 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 672 (White, J., concurring).
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 673 n.2.
448 u.s. 1 (1980).
Id. at 4-8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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Perhaps the restrictive interpretation of section 1983 in Chapman by
Justices Stevens and Blackmun was prompted, at least in part, by federalism concerns. As the Maine Supreme Court pointed out in its
Thiboutot opinion, allowing concurrent jurisdiction in section 1983 actions lessens the friction in federal-state relations and is consistent with
the concepts of federalism expounded in Younger v. Harris. 129 In addition, although inconsistent with the legislative intent of the 1871 Act, 130
allowing concurrent jurisdiction provides a vehicle for challenging state
violations of a federal statute that does not provide a private right of
action, without increasing the potential caseload of federal courts.
The dissenters in Thiboutot, Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger,
and Justice Rehnquist, disputed the majority's interpretation of the
"plain" language of section 1983 and once again reviewed the historical
evidence on the enactment of the legislation, 131 finding that section
1983 protects only equal rights legislation. They further considered the
"practical consequences" of the decision-the potential increase in section 1983 litigation on both federal and state levels 132 and the potential
federalism problems 133-before concluding that the majority decision
"creates a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our federal
system." 134
It appears, then, that concerns about increased litigation and intrusions into state sovereignty have influenced at least some Court members' treatment of section 1983 actions. Similar concerns, will be
evident in the Court's treatment of suits brought under section 1985(3).
A successful argument for expansion of section 1985(3) must therefore
demonstrate that (1) any federal-state conflicts would be minimal and
(2) any increase in the caseload of federal courts would be negligible
and justifiable because no other remedy exists.
An examination of the four opinions in Novotn)' reveals that the
majority, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist, believed that allowing a section 1985(3) action would result
in some impermissible overlapping with an existing federal statute129. 405 A.2d 230, 235 (Me. 1979) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
130. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 313 (remarks of Rep. Burchard);
id. at 485 (remarks of Rep. Cook), 514 (remarks of Rep. Poland), 112 (remarks of Rep.
Moore).
131. 448 U.S. at 12-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132. I d. at 22-26. ''No one can predict the extent to which litigation arising from today's
decision will harass state and local officials; nor can one foresee the number of new filings in
our already overburdened courts. But no one can doubt that these consequences will be
substantial." Id. at 23.
133. Id. at 26-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 33.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 135 The majority opinion,
however, was limited to a very narrow issue and avoided addressing
two important questions: first, whether or not a section 1985(3) action
would have been allowed had the defendant in Novotny not been subject to suit under Title VII, and second, whether or not section 1985(3)
creates a remedy for any federal statutory right.
Justices Powell and Stevens, who addressed these issues in their
concurring opinions, concluded that section 1985(3) should be "limited
to conspiracies to violate those fundamental rights derived from the
Constitution." 136 Justice Stevens suggested that section 1985(3), if constitutionally based on the Thirteenth Amendment, could remedy private conspiracies to deprive the litigant of the right to engage in
interstate travel and the right to be free from badges qf slavery. 137
Based on his perception of the intent of the 1871 Congress, he added,
Other privileges and immunities of citizenship such as the
right to due process oflaw and the right to equal protection of the
laws are protected by the Constitution only against state action. . . . [I]f private persons take conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the constituted authorities of any State from
giving or securing equal treatment, . . . the private persons
would then have violated [§ 1985(3)].
If, however, private persons engage in purely private acts of
discrimination . . . they do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 138
Thus, it appears that both Justices Powell and Stevens do not favor an
expansion of section 1985(3), as it would be extremely difficult to conceive of a case in which a private conspiracy would violate fundamental constitutional rights since most of these rights do not apply to
private action. 139
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in Novotny on
several grounds. 14° First, they argued that section 1985(3) is not a remedial statute but is a substantive statute designed to punish the conspiracy itself. 141 Second, they contended that any overlap between
section 1985(3) and Title VII is permissible, since the former merely
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
85.
140.
141.

See 442 U.S. at 377-78.
Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 381-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 384.
The exceptions are some of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. Id. at 381-

Id. at 385 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 388-91.

HeinOnline -- 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 603 1981-1982

604

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9:579

supplements the latter. 142 Finally, they contended that section 1985(3)
should apply to violations of all rights guaranteed by federal
statutes. 143
Thus, three members of the Court strongly favor expansion of section 1985(3) to encompass federal statutory rights, and two members
strongly oppose such expansion. Justice Stewart, the author of the majority opinions in both Gr!ffin and Novotny, has retired, and Justice
O'Connor's views are virtually unknown; the attitudes of Chief Justice
Burger, and of Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, are therefore pivotal
in determining the future course of section 1985(3).
Clearly, since five members of the Court-Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Stevens, Blackmun, and Rehnquist-view section
1985(3) as remedial, it is unlikely that the Court will change this position in the near future. Further, the voting pattern of Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist in Chapman and Thiboutot indicates that
they hold a restrictive view of the post-Civil War civil rights statutes
and are unlikely to vote in favor of any expansion in scope of section
1985(3). Justice Blackmun, however, is more of an enigma. He sided
with the majority in Chapman, Novotny, and Thiboutot. Assuming he
fully accepted the reasoning of the majority opinion in each of these
cases, Justice Blackmun might be amenable to some limited expansion
of the scope of section 1985(3). His position in Chapman as well as in
Novotny seems to suggest that he is concerned with minimizing overlapping remedies on either the state or the federal level. His agreement
with the majority in Thiboutot, however, suggests that he is only concerned with overlapping remedies when the issue appears at the federal
level. Thus, it appears that no more than four members of the Court
might be amenable to some expansion of the scope of section 1985(3),
while four Justices probably would not favor such an expansion. Justice O'Connor's vote therefore may be critical to a resolution of this
question.
Justice O'Connor's brief tenure as a judge on the Arizona Court of
Appeals provides little insight into her judicial philosophy. 144 In a recent law review article, however, she expressed her concern about the
increased caseload caused by section 1983 cases and by the failure of
Congress to limit, either directly or indirectly, the use of section 1983 in
142. Id. at 391-96.
143. Id.
144. Justice O'Connor served approximately one and one-half years on the Arizona
Court of Appeals.
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federal courts. 145 She apparently believes that federal court intervention threatens the viability of our bifurcated judicial system. 146 The
general tenor of the article suggests that federal courts should defer
more often to state courts in cases involving federal constitutional questions. 147 If this view is expressed in her decisions as a Supreme Court
Justice, then it is probable that Justice O'Connor will cast her vote with
those of the Chief Justice and of Justices Powell, Stevens, and Rehnquist, favoring a restrictive scope to section 1985(3). 148

Conclusion
It appears that section 1985(3) is doomed to remain a relatively
obscure remnant of the Reconstruction era, in large part because of a
conservative Court and an extremely heavy federal caseload. Development of section 1985(3) during the less restrictive era of the Warren
Court was hindered by the requirement of state action imposed by Collins v. Hardyman. By the time this barrier ·was removed in Griffin v.
Breckenridge, the mood of the Court had changed; efforts to expand
the scope of section 1985(3) had come too late. Given the atypical facts
of Novotny and its very narrow holding, there is a remote possibility
that a majority of the Court might be willing to allow the expansion of
section 1985(3) in a limited number of cases, particularly those in
which the claimed injury more closely resembles the type of injuries
that the drafters of the 1871 Act intended to remedy. Thus, the litigant
145. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 810 (1981). Justice
O'Connor suggested limiting or disallowing attorneys' fees in § 1983 cases as one possible
way Congress might limit the use of§ 1983. She stated, "Such a move would be welcomed
by state courts," and also questioned the impact of the Federal Question Jurisdictional
Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369, which eliminated the
$10,000 amount in controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
O'Connor, supra.
146. Id. at 814-15.
147. Id.
148. A recent statement by Justice O'Connor appears to be consistent with the views
expressed in her law review article. In particular, on March 9, 1982, Justice O'Connor, while
testifying on the Supreme Court's budget before the United States House of Representatives
Appropriation Subcommittee, suggested that Congress should enact legislation that would
limit the number of§ 1983 cases reaching the Court because of its heavy caseload. Justice
O'Connor Breaks Silence "Rule" in House Testimony, Houston Chron., March 10, 1982, § l,
at 9. Her statement, when taken in conjunction with the Court's recent decision in Polk
County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981), seems to suggest that absent some binding precedent to the contrary, Justice O'Connor is willing to limit access to the Court by way of
§ 1983 and, by implication, § 1985(3). In Polk County, the Court held that § 1983 does not
cover acts by a state-employed public defender because the public defender serves the public, not the state, by performing an essentially private function. I d. at 449-50, 453.
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would probably have to be a member of a class which is subject to
invidious class-based discrimination-a limiting factor. The most difficult task facing potential section 1985(3) litigants is to :find some substantive right, either constitutional or statutory, that can be remedied
by section 1985(3). Indeed, the extent to which the section can remedy
statutory rights is still unclear. Nevertheless, it is hoped that Novotny
will not discourage others from attempting to persuade the Court that
expansion of section 1985(3) is necessary to insure full civil rights for
all citizens.
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